Indiana Law Journal
Volume 38

Issue 3

Article 7

Spring 1963

Some Problems of Constructive Delivery, Agency and Proof in Gift
Litigation
Patrick J. Rohan
St. John's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Rohan, Patrick J. (1963) "Some Problems of Constructive Delivery, Agency and Proof in Gift Litigation,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 38 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol38/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

SOME PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY, AGENCY
AND PROOF IN GIFT LITIGATION
PATRICK

J.

ROHANt

In the initial installment of this paper, the writer sought to discern
the practical and theoretical bases for the requirement of delivery, and to
indicate that recognized social values would be fostered by the adoption
of a more realistic and less formal approach to the subject of gifts.'
The concluding portion of this article is devoted to an analysis of
the three subsidiary problems or aspects of gift litigation, specifically,
the nature and scope of the "constructive delivery" doctrine, the agency
question posed where the donor utilizes a third party to transmit the
property, and the standard to be applied in determining whether an alleged
donee has carried his burden of proof. The lack of flexibility historically
exhibited by the courts in approaching the delivery question has induced
claimants to avoid a frontal assault on the issue, and to fall back on the
less demanding constructive delivery doctrine, whenever satisfaction of
the traditional requirement is in doubt. Under the pressure thus created,
the courts have vacillated between the desire to sanction genuine gifts
and the attempt to preserve the requirement of transfer of possession,
dominion and control. As a consequence, the constructive delivery cases
reflect, not a liberalized definition of delivery, but relief granted in
isolated and irreconcilable factual patterns.2 The forays into the field of
agency, occasioned by the presence of an intermediary in the picture, also
present a fertile field for study. The agency cases in particular demonstrate the needless rejection of an otherwise effectual transaction brought
about by an undue stress on abstract theory. Finally, the burden of proof
aspect has been selected for treatment because of the unfathomable, and
often insurmountable, standard applied in many jurisdictions, namely,
the "clear and convincing evidence" test or some variant thereof. In daily
operation, this burden supplies the focus for the courts' overriding concern
for fraud prevention and exerts a strong influence on the outcome of
any given case. In examining these topics an effort will be made to
evaluate the extent to which the actual operation of the courts coincides
,John Jay Fellow, Columbia Law School 1962-63; Assistant Professor, St. John's
University School of Law.
1. The Continuing Question of Delivery in the Law of Gifts, 38 IND. LJ. 1 (1962).
2. See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses
in Action Evideiced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REV. 341, 355 (1926) ; Stoljar, The Delivery of Chattels, 21 MODERN L Rzv. 27, 42 (1958).
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with, or departs from, the substantive law rules laid down in the opinions.:
In view of the large number of precedents involved, it has been deemed
best to proceed by way of a study of the decisions of a single jurisdiction;
New York was selected because of the large number of cases which have
arisen in that state, as well as the influence which those decisions have
exerted on the development of the law nationally.
THE CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY DOCTRINE
The theory that a constructive delivery has taken place is frequently
employed to obviate the difficulties occasioned by the failure of the
donor to proceed by way of a physical transfer of the object to the donee.
Although the doctrine is typically considered by litigants to be a safety
valve, or panacea, it remains true that it operates within the narrow confines allotted to it by precedent. From a definitional standpoint, the
concept has been refined into two distinct, though frequently overlapping,
sub-categories, those of "constructive" and "symbolic" delivery. In
the opinions, including those rendered in New York, these labels frequently are used interchangeably.' However, when placed in juxtaposition, "constructive" delivery has been applied to situations in which the
donor transfers an instrument or object (such as a key), which theoretically enables the donee to exercise dominion and control over the subject matter of the gift; "symbolic" delivery has been utilized to describe
the cases in which a donor engages in a ceremonial act (such as the
transfer of a token portion of the gift) to represent, or act as a substitute
for, a delivery of the gift itself.' In view of the uncertain status of the
3.

The approach here employed is that advocated in Llewellyn, A Realistic .Turis-

prudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUm. L. REv. 431 (1930).
One seeks the real practice on the subject, by study of how the cases do in fact
eventuate. One seeks to determine how far the paper rule is real, how far
merely paper. One seeks an understanding of actual judicial behavior, in that
comparison of rule with practice; one follows also the use made of the paper
rule in argument by judges and by counsel, and the apparent influence of its

official presence on decisions. One seeks to determine when it is stated, but
ignored; when it is stated and followed; when and why it is expressly narrowed
or extended or modified, so that a new paper rule is created.
Id. at 450.
4. See, e.g., Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N.Y. Supp. 225 (Ist Dep't
1919) ; MeGavic v. Cossum, 72 App. Div. 35, 76 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1st Dep't 1902) ; Matter of Lines, 21 Misc. 2d 699, 201 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Surr. Ct. 1959) ; Matter of Frothingham, 161 Misc. 317, 291 N.Y. Supp. 656 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Matter of Goodwin, 114
Misc. 39, 185 N.Y. Supp. 461 (Surr. Ct. 1920) ; Coutant v. Schuyler, 1 Paige Ch. 316

(N.Y. Ct. Ch. 1829).
5. In spite of the common use of the adjectives symbolical and constructive in
the alternative, it should be noticed that there is a significant distinction between
them, which the courts will, when the decision of the case requires it, not be
loath to make. A delivery is symbolical, when instead of the thing itself, some
other object is handed over in its name and stead. A delivery is constructive,
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symbolic category, as well as its narrow practical application, the discussion will be focused upon a broad view of the constructive delivery
6
cases.
Sharp differences of opinion have arisen as to the interpretation to
be given constructive delivery. Some have accentuated the "delivery"
portion of the term and asserted that it connotes an actual delivery,
differing from manual tradition only to the extent that the property has
peculiar features which dictate that it may only be transferred in certain
limited ways. Others have stressed the "constructive" element and voiced
the belief that a change of possession or control has not taken place, nor
is it necessary that it take place, if the delivery phase of the gift is described
by the adjective "constructive." An analysis of the cases reveals that
the latter view is both the modem and more accurate one. The defect in the former view is that in factual patterns in which some
peculiar feature of the subject matter limits the mode of transmission;
the transfer accepted as "constructive" could well be treated as a traditional delivery in the full sense of the term. The ambiguities inherent
in the constructive delivery terminology are reflected in the definitions
laid down in the texts and opinions. Early in the last century, Chancellor
Kent declared the applicable principle to be that:
Delivery . . . must be according to the nature of the thing.

It must be an actual delivery so far as the subject is capable of
delivery. It must be secundum subjectam materiam, and be the
true and effectual way of obtaining the command and dominion
of the subject. If the thing be not capable of actual delivery,
there must be some act equivalent to it. The donor must part, not
only with possession, but with the dominion of the property.
If the thing given be a chose in action, the law requires an
when in place of actual manual tradition the donor delivers to the donee the
means of obtaining possession and control of the subject matter, or in some
other manner relinquishes to the object of his benefaction power and dominion
over it.
BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY

§ 41, at 102 (2d ed. 1955).
6. The courts have been reluctant to recognize a purely token or ceremonial transfer as sufficient. Thus, for example, in Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. R. 51 (1806), Chancellor Kent concluded that:
A mere symbolical delivery would not, I apprehend, have been sufficient. The
cases in which the delivery of a symbol has been held sufficient to perfect a
gift, were those in which it was considered as equivalent to actual delivery, as
the delivery of a key to a trunk, of a room or warehouse, which was the true
and effectual way of obtaining the use and command of the subject. . . . I do
not know that corn, growing, is susceptible of delivery, in any other way than
by putting the donee in possession of the soil. ...
Id. at 56. See 1 WALsH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW or REAL PROPERTY § 29 (1947).
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assignment, or some equivalent instrument and the transfer
must be actually executed.'
The language Kent employed discloses the antithetical elements in any
theory of constructive delivery which limits its application to cases in
which the donor has effectively relinquished possession, dominion and
control. Under Kent's definition, if the object does not admit of "actual"
delivery, there must be some transaction or step taken which is "equivalent" to it. But if there is no de facto relinquishment of possession
or dominion, it is difficult to see what acts would be equivalent to it
without necessarily having the same practical, as well as legal, effect.
The true nature of the constructive delivery vehicle, as largely an
exception to, or substitute for, "actual" delivery, is found in the oft-quoted
language from the opinion in Vincent v. Rix,' perhaps the most influential
passage in this area:
The delivery necessary to consumate a gift must be as perfect
as the nature of the property and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties will reasonably permit; there must be
a change of dominion and ownership; intention or mere words
cannot supply the place of an actual surrender of control and
authority over the thing intended to be given.9
Although this definition also equates constructive delivery with a complete transfer, the italicized portion indicates a significant shift in
viewpoint. Attention is there focused on factors extrinsic to the donor
and the subject matter of the gift, namely, on the "circumstances and
surroundings of the parties." This language, when coupled with the
notion that the "reasonableness" of what was actually done is to be considered, reflects a transition from a view that would exact unswerving
compliance with a pre-existing standard, to an ad hoc approach which
would consider the exigencies of the moment as well as the most
desirable method of effectuating a donative transfer. This may not have
been the court's intention; however, the long range effect of the quoted
7. 2 KENT, Co~mmENTAms

439, at 355 (Halstead ed. 1827).

8. 248 N.Y. 76, 161 N.E. 425 (1928).

9. Id. at 83, 161 N.E. at 427. (Emphasis added.)

421, 22 N.E. 940 (1889), the court stated:

In Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y.

But delivery by the donor, either actual or constructive, operating to divest the
donor of possession of and dominion over the thing, is a constant and essential factor in every transaction which takes effect as a completed gift. Anything short of this strips it of the quality of completeness which distinguishes
an intention to give, which alone amounts to nothing, from the consummated

act, which changes the title.
Id. at 429, 22 N.E. at 941.

474
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language has been the broadening of the delivery concept along the lines
suggested.
A review of the constructive delivery cases which have been sustained
reveals that two elements have proven of great significance, the presence
of extenuating circumstances, which induce the court to accept a less than
perfect transfer, and the existence of a writing authored by the donor.
Although these features are often found in combination, they will be
discussed separately for purposes of clarity. The courts have found a
synthetic delivery to be an acceptable substitute for manual tradition
in cases wherein the extenuating circumstances ranged from mere inconvenience to a practical impossibility of complying with traditional requirements. Thus, for example, an excusing cause has been found where
the object was located in the donor's apartment, which was then in the
possession of a sublessee."0 Such cause also has been found in cases
wherein the donor did not have the object with him at the time.1 However, the typical factual pattern has been one in which the donor, in ill
health or nearing death, was unable to manually transfer the subject
matter because of sheer lack of physical strength, the location of the
object at a distant place, or a combination of these factors. 2 Thus, for
3 a hospitalized
example, in Pwshcash v. Dry Dock Say. Institution,"
patient attempted to retrieve his bank book in order to make a gift of it
to a visitor. The doctor informed him that his valuables were in the
office of the hospital, which was closed at the time. The patient thereupon
instructed the physican that in case he died he wanted his visitor to
have the bank book. The donor succumbed the day before the friend
returned. The court ruled that:
When decedent, as well as plaintiff, was told by Dr. Sager that
the bank book was not in the decedent's clothes, but was in the
cashier's office downstairs, and that it could not then be had because the office was dosed, but that upon the plaintiff's coming
around the next day the doctor would see that the book was
delivered to him, there was then delivery to plaintiff in pursuance of the donor's intent. The delivery was as perfect and
complete as the circumstances and surroundings of the parties
10. Matter of Goodwin, 114 Misc. 39, 185 N.Y. Supp. 461 (Surr. Ct. 1920).
11.

Matter of Frothingham, 161 Misc. 317, 291 N.Y. Supp. 656 (Surr. Ct. 1936);

Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919).
12. See, e.g., Matter of Sweeney, 259 App. Div. 935, 19 N.Y.S.2d 530 (3d Dep't
1940) ; McGavic v. Cossum, 72 App. Div. 35, 76 N.Y. Supp. 305 (1st Dep't 1902) ; Matter of Lines, 21 Misc. 2d 699, 201 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Surr. Ct. 1959) ; Matter of Wernick,
110 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Surr. Ct. 1952) (not otherwise reported); Matter of Braun, 121
Misc. 18, 200 N.Y. Supp. 781 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
13. 140 Misc. 579, 251 N.Y. Supp. 184 (City Ct. 1931).
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to the gift reasonably permitted, and this being so, the gift was
consumated."4
Incapacity steming from serious illness has invariably proven to be an
accepted occasion for relaxation of the delivery requirement." In other
situations, however, the courts have differed in their liberality, with
some decisions requiring extreme necessity before constructive delivery
may be employed,"8 and others indicating that mere inconvenience will
suffice.
Confusion and uncertainty have also surrounded the question
whether a gift may be effectuated by means of an informal writing or
letter of gift transmitted to the donee." Although the courts have been
quite uniform in upholding such transactions, there is no singular theory
upon which acceptance is based. 9 In some instances the rationale employed is that the writing acts ex proprio vigore2 0 while in others its
effectiveness is attributed to the fact that abolition of the seal elevated
unsealed instruments to the status of a deed under seal." In several
decisions the writing has been enforced as an assignment (especially
14. Id. at 581, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 186.
15. The principal limitation in this area has proven to be the case wherein the
court concludes that the one charged with caring for the donor in his last illness may
have exerted undue influence or obtained the property or documents for purposes wholly
unconnected with a donative transaction.
16. See Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 100 N.E. 802 (1913); Matter of
Brockway, 85 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Surr. Ct. 1948) (not otherwise reported); Matter of
James, 148 Misc. 124, 265 N.Y. Supp. 369 (Surr. Ct. 1933) ; cf. Matter of Fitzpatrick,
17 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (not otherwise reported).
17. See, e.g., Matter of Cummings, 181 App. Div. 286, 168 N.Y. Supp. 828 (3d
Dep't 1917) ; Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
18. The "letter of gift" cases have fared well, despite the fact that a symbolic
delivery is of doubtful validity (and in the face of usually fatal agency implications).
See, e.g., Hillary Holding Corp. v. Brooklyn Jockey Club, 88 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct.
1949) (not otherwise reported) ; Matter of Speigel, 13 Misc. 2d 113, 175 N.Y.S.2d 882
(Surr. Ct. 1958); Matter of DeBitche, 207 Misc. 237, 136 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Surr. Ct.
1954) ; Matter of Kaufman, 201 Misc. 905, 107 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Matter
of Frothingham, 161 Misc. 317, 291 N.Y. Supp. 656 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Manacher v.
Sterling Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 4 Misc. 2d 1069, 160 N.Y.S.2d 220 (City Ct. 1957).
But see Matter of Weber, 163 Misc. 81, 296 N.Y. Supp. 433 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
In Speelman v. Pascal, 10 N.Y.2d 313, 178 N.E.2d 723 (1961), the Court of Appeals
upheld a delivery consisting of a letter sent to the donee in which the donor assigned a
percentage of future royalties to be received if and when a musical version of "Pygmalion" was produced.
19. The employment of a writing appears to be more satisfactory than the other
principal form of constructive delivery, the tradition of a key to a receptacle or safe
deposit box. However, the courts have also been disposed to enforce the latter type of
transaction, except where undue influence or lack of donative intent appears to have
been present, or where extenuating circumstances are entirely lacking.
20. See, e.g., Carroll v. Smith, 229 App. Div. 286, 241 N.Y. Supp. 546 (3d Dep't
1930) ; Matter of Braun, 121 Misc. 18, 200 N.Y. Supp. 781 (Surr. Ct. 1923).
21. See cases cited in 1 WALS r, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 31, at 236 n.7 (1947).
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in cases wherein a chose in action formed the subject matter of the
gift).2 On occasion the courts have relied upon the theory that no delivery is necessary where a writing is placed in the donee's hands,23 or
on the hybrid view that the delivery requirement is "relaxed" in such
cases.2" This last position is sometimes expressed in terms of a change
in the burden of proof (from a requirement of clear and convincing
evidence to a less demanding standard),25 or in terms of very little
additional evidence being necessary to sustain the alleged gift." It is also
held that an informal writing found among the donor's effects merely
serves as evidence of a gift, or as an admission against interest on the
part of the donor.2 Also to be considered are the cases which imply that
the use of such a document will not be permitted unless accompanied by
extenuating circumstances.28
Seldom, if ever, have the courts fully explored the ramifications of
the constructive delivery concept itself. When subjected to close scrutiny,
22. See, e.g., Gray v. Barton, 55 N.Y. 68, 13 Am. Rep. 181 (1873); Matter of
Palmer, 117 App. Div. 360, 102 N.Y. Supp. 236 (3d Dep't 1907); Matter of Dunne, 136
Misc. 250, 240 N.Y. Supp. 845 (Surr. Ct. 1930); Matter of Valentine, 122 Misc. 486,
204 N.Y. Supp. 284 (Surr. Ct. 1924).
23. Strong language to this effect appears in Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392,
176 N.Y. Supp. 225 (1st Dep't 1919). There the court stated:
The necessity of delivery where gifts resting in parol are asserted against the
estate of decedents is obvious; but it is equally plain that there is no such impelling necessity when the gift is established by the execution and delivery of
'an instrument of gift An examination of a large number of cases in this State
discloses the significant facts that (1) in every case where the gift was not
sustained, the gift rested upon parol evidence; and (2) in every case of a gift
evidenced by the delivery of an instrument of gift, the gift has been sustained.
Id. at 395-96, 176 N.Y. Supp. at 227. Hawkins v. Union Trust Co., 187 App. Div. 472,
175 N.Y. Supp. 694 (1st Dep't 1919), decided at the same time, utilizes a similar approach. See Matter of Roosevelt, 190 Misc. 341, 73 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Surr. Ct. 1947);
Matter of Braun, 121 Misc. 18, 200 N.Y. Supp. 781 (Surr. Ct 1923).
24. See, e.g., Matter of Brown, 130 Misc. 865, 226 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Surr. Ct 1927),
modified, 225 App. Div. 759, 232 N.Y. Supp. 371 (2d Dep't 1928).
25. See, e.g., Matter of Goodwin, 114 Misc. 39, 185 N.Y. Supp. 461 (Surr. Ct.
1920) ; see also Matter of Stalden, 194 N.Y. Supp. 349 (Surr. Ct. 1922) (not otherwise
reported).
26. See, e.g., Matter of Pastore, 155 Misc. 247, 279 N.Y. Supp. 200 (Surr. Ct
1935) ; Matter of Sullivan, 133 Misc. 758, 234 N.Y. Supp. 311 (Surr. Ct. 1929);
Brinckerhoff v. Lawrence, 2 Sandf. Ch. R. 400 (N.Y. Ct Ch. 1845).
27. See, e.g., Miller v. Silverman, 247 N.Y. 447, 160 N.E. 910 (1928); Govin v.
DeMiranda, 140 N.Y. 474, 35 N.E. 626 (1893); Matter of Kaphan, 176 Misc. 228, 26
N.Y.S.2d 910 (Surr. Ct. 1941); cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Holley, 280 N.Y. 330, 20
N.E.2d 776 (1939) (completed insurance forms). The cases in which an envelope containing an acknowledgment of a past gift of the contents is found among the decedent's
effects (typically in his safe deposit box) have met with mixed success. If a generalization can be made, it is that such gifts will fail if no additional evidence can be found
to show a completed delivery during the decedent's lifetime. See, e.g., Matter of Randall, 2 Misc. 2d 257, 155 N.Y.S.2d 675 (Surr. Ct. 1956); Matter of Van Wert, 193
Misc. 165, 83 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
28. See, e.g., Matter of Fitzpatrick, 17 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (not otherwise reported). See note 16 supra.
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one wonders whether the doctrine meshes with other forces or principles
applicable in the gift area, such as the view that delivery is an operative,
rather than evidentiary, fact, and the utilization of the clear and convincing evidence test in cases involving death bed donations.29 If the
constructive delivery concept is applicable in any case wherein the "circumstances and surroundings of the parties" rule out a full-fledged
delivery, it would appear that the goals or functions assigned to delivery
may be met by a less demanding standard (in view of the fact that lack
of an "actual" delivery does not negate recognition of the factual patterns
sheltered under the "constructive" umbrella)." Problems of theory also
remain, even if the courts insist that, as in the holdover tenant situation,
only medical necessity will authorize the granting of a reprieve. If the
jurisdiction tacitly or explicitly adopts the viewpoint that a recognized
constructive delivery brings about a transfer of possession or dominion
and control, it would appear that the absence of ill health or other
difficulty should be immaterial. Conversely, their presence should not
enable a court to find the necessary delivery in situations wherein one
would not otherwise exist."1 However, it may well be that the constructive
delivery vehicle represents a shift from traditional thinking on the
subject, to an "acceptable substitute under adverse circumstances" approach. If this rationale is accepted, and it seems to have some foundation
insofar as it explains the results achieved more plausibly than does any
tortured concept of possession or control, there is no logical necessity for
limiting the doctrine's application to cases in which the donor is physically
incapacitated (especially where the verbalization of the formula takes
into account both the "circumstances" and "surroundings" of the parties).
It appears anamolous that the courts insist upon physical incapacity, or at
least look with great favor upon it as a makeweight, since such an
approach limits the availability of constructive delivery to the death bed
gift area for all practical purposes. It thus confines its operation to
the segment of the gift field most subject to suspicion and criticism,
while ruling it out in large measure in the inter vivos gift cases, wherein
29.

The same medical condition of the donor which favors permitting a construc-

tive delivery also forms the key fact in the death bed gift field and, in some measure,
is responsible for the courts' fear of fraud or overreaching. See Matter of Creekmore, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 135 N.E.2d 193 (1956).
30. Some commentators have observed that if the formulas stated in the definitions of constructive delivery were literally interpreted, no delivery would be necessary
in cases where the circumstances or subject matter of the gift did not admit of a delivery. Such a result is approached in the Pushcash decision, supra note 13.
31. The appearance of logical consistency is retained by use of the constructive
delivery fiction; however, the "constructive" cases could be relegated to the categories
of "actual" delivery and no delivery (if viewed from the standpoint of effectuating a
transfer of possession or dominion and control).
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the alleged donor is available to contest spurious claims.8 2
It is suggested that the constructive delivery cases as a whole may
best be explained by viewing the transaction in each case, not as a makeshift delivery which results in a change of possession or dominion, but
as a factual pattern compelling enough to give rise to an exercise of the
courts' dispensing power. The impossibility of reconciling many of the
"constructive" and "actual" delivery cases, as well as the difficulties
encountered in trying to synthesize the various situations within the
"constructive" category, suggest that a jurisprudence of factual patterns,
rather than of principles, has taken root. 3 The donee then must endeavor to bring his case within one of the molds, or islands of safety,
established by prior case law. Nevertheless, the constructive delivery cases
may hold the key to a workable concept of delivery, by demonstrating a
realistic approach to the question whether a transaction has passed into
the realm of an executed gift, as opposed to resting at the stage of mere
intention. 4
Ti-E AGENCY QUESTION

The agency issue presented by an attempt to effectuate a gift through
the offices of a third party, followed by the death of the donor prior
to completion of the intermediary's mission, is a recurring one and has
been answered in various ways in different jurisdictions. Nationally
the solutions have ranged from a presumption that the third party is the
agent of the donor, to the contrary presumption that he is the agent of the
donee. In several states the third party is characterized as a trustee for
the donee, while in others no status is presumed, the question being treated
as one of fact." As with many other facets of the gift field, it is probable
that the law here operates mechanically, without any positive correlation
with the intentions of the donor. It may be that his unexpressed desires
can never be ascertained with certainty, since the donor is usually unaware
of the agency implications of his actions and has formed no judgment
32. In other jurisdictions, for example, the informal writing is held to be ineffectual in gifts causa mortis cases as violative of the statute of wills. See Mechem,
The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action Evidenccd by
Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 356 (1926).
33. No sustained attempt has been made to systematize the cases or to overrule
earlier inconsistent decisions. Again, the recurrence of familiar factual patterns ordinarily enables the court to place a set of facts within the ambit of a prior, well known
decision. Unfortunately, the precedents are so numerous and varied that decisions may
be found supporting and defeating all but the clearest case.
34. An interesting approach is found in Matter of Sullivan, 133 Misc. 758, 234
N.Y. Supp. 311 (Surr. Ct. 1929). There the court considered the fact that the donor
had done all that he considered to be necessary to consummate the gift.
35. See Mechem, supra note 32; BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40 (2d ed. 1955).
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as to whether he is commissioning someone to act for him or as the alter
ego of the donee. A presumption in favor of the donee would further the
social values set forth in the first portion of this paper. Nevertheless, it
would appear that sound conclusions may be arrived at by treating the
question as one of fact.3" Here difficulties are presented by the inaccessibility of the donor's intention and the fact that a court adopting a neutral
approach may unconsciously lean toward one conclusion or the other.
In recent years some opinions have clouded the issue by all but assuming
that the intermediary is the agent of the donor, while professing to
represent an ad hoc factual determination. The decisions of the New
York courts have evidenced a noticeable drift in this direction. Thus,
for example, the earlier opinions frequently contained a statement to the
effect that, in order for the gift to be effective, the intermediary must
be the agent of the donee, or at least not the agent of the donor." This
may have been a tacit recognition of the complexity of reconstructing
the donor's hypothetical intention and an abandonment of the agency
search whenever the evidence indicated that, in any event, no agency was
intended on the donor's behalf. Stated differently, this view might
recognize the position that no agency designation need be sought, and that
the third party's status could remain without a label, as long as the
36. Difficulties arise where the intent of the donor is not expressed or such
expression is ambiguous as to whether the things are delivered to the third person as the donor's agent or as agent or trustee of the donee. Here as in many
other situations of doubtful fact turning on intent we can only apply to the
facts of each case the test of what the average man would intend under the
circumstances, and here as in other cases of disputed intent depending on the
facts, the question is generally for the jury. It is quite useless to seek rules of
law settling such controversies. The question is one of fact for the jury, subject to the court's usual power to take the case from the jury where the facts
are so clear that only one result can fairly be reached.
1 WALSH, COIMENTARMS 01 THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 30, at 228-29 (1947).
37. In Vincent v. Rix, 24S N.Y. 76, 83, 161 N.E. 425, 427 (1928), the court wrote:
While delivery may be made to a third party for and in behalf of the donee,
yet handing the property to an agent of the donor to be delivered to the donee
is not sufficient. The matter was well stated in Bickford v. Mattocks 95 Me.
547, 550, 50 A. 894, 895:
"Not every delivery to a third person is a delivery for the donee, or for
the use of the donee, in the sense in which these phrases are used in the cases
cited. There may be a delivery to a third person which constitutes him the
agent of the donor, and there may be a delivery which constitutes him a trustee
for the donee, and the distinction lies in the intention with which the delivery
is made. If the donor deliver the property to the third person simply for the
purpose of his delivering it to the donee as the agent of the donor, the gift is not
complete until the property has actually been delivered to the donee. Such a
delivery is not absolute, for the ordinary principle of agency applies, by which
the donor can revoke the authority of the agent, and resume possession of the
property, at any time before the authority is executed."
See Matter of Rainbow, 163 Misc. 732, 298 N.Y. Supp. 79 (Surr. Ct. 1936), aff'd mern.,
251 App. Div. 809, 298 N.Y. Supp. 89 (1st Dep't 1937).
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proof did not lead to a finding that the donor intended the intermediary
to be his agent.
A comparison of the older cases with later ones reveals that factual
patterns which might have been upheld at an earlier date would now in all
probability fail, although the prior decisions have not been overruled
and are constantly cited both locally and nationally. Thus, for example,
5 the donor,
in the leading case of Grymes v. Hone,"
in ill health, drew
up an absolute assignment of twenty shares of stock. He then handed
the assignment to his wife, stating: "I intend this for Nelly. If I die, do
not give this to the executors; it is not for them but for Nelly; give it to
her, yourself." When asked by his wife why he did not give it to the donee
immediately, he remarked: "I do not know how much longer I may last,
or what may happen, or whether we may not need it." The occasion for
the above declaration centered around the act of the husband in handing
the assignment to his wife to be placed in a tin box containing his will
and other papers. Although the factual pattern is made to order for a
finding of an attempted testamentary transaction, the court sidestepped
that issue, on the strength of an ingenious gift causa mortis theory, and
went on to hold the donor's wife to be the agent of the donee.3" The conversation previously described would appear to indicate that a finding
of agency on behalf of the donor would also have been proper, and possibly
more proper than the conclusion actually reached (in view of the representative capacity in which the wife was holding the property and the
fact that its transmission was not to take place if the donor countermanded
his original expression of donative intent).
In sharp contrast are the results reached in several recent cases in
38. 49 N.Y. 17, 10 Am. Rep. 313 (1872).
39. The wording of the opinion's key sentence is to the effect that the wife was
the agent of the "donor." However, the context, as well as the holdings of the cases
cited immediately thereafter, clearly demonstrate that the word "donee" was intended.
While most of the more recent decisions have run counter to the spirit and holding
of Gryntes v. Hone, an occasional case has followed it. However, there is no formula
available to enable the attorney to predict which of the two lines of cases will be followed (although, as stated above, it is probable that the decision will run counter to the
Grymnes v. Hone result). Representative cases in which the decision has been followed
are: Matter of Mills, 172 App. Div. 530, 158 N.Y. Supp. 1100 (1st Dep't), aff'd inem.,
219 N.Y. 642, 114 N.E. 1072 (1916) ; Matter of Spiegel, 13 Misc. 2d 113, 175 N.Y.S.2d
882 (Surr. Ct. 1958) ; Matter of Essex, 1 Pow. 28, 20 N.Y. Supp. 62 (Surr. Ct. 1891);
Williams v. Guile, 117 N.Y. 343, 22 N.E. 1071 (1889).
The following are illustrative of the cases reaching a contrary conclusion on similar
facts: Partridge v. Kearns, 32 App. Div. 483, 53 N.Y. Supp. 154 (2d Dep't 1898);
Matter of Steinrich, 133 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Surr. Ct. 1954) (not otherwise reported) ; Matter of Adams, 58 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Surr. Ct. 1945) (not otherwise reported) ; Matter of
Zweig, 176 Misc. 770, 29 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Surr. Ct. 1941) ; Matter of Fitzpatrick, 17
N.Y.S.2d 280 (Surr. Ct. 1940) (not otherwise reported) ; Matter of Weber, 163 Misc.

81, 296 N.Y. Supp. 433 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
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which gifts have failed, and even the rationale employed in instances in
which donations have been upheld. Although the courts have seldom
specifically addressed themselves to the point, it appears that the fact that
the intermediary is closer to the donor than to the donee, by way of
social or business relation, influences their decision. The fact that it was
the donor who requested the intermediary to act also appears to predetermine the issue to some extent. The result is that the Gryrnes v. Hone
case has been abandoned in practice, although technically it has never
been overruled.
A few illustrative decisions will serve to demonstrate the interplay
of these factors. In Matter of Malloy,4" the court was presented with a
situation where a donor directed a subordinate in the employ of his
corporation, one Davis, to prepare certain deeds and a satisfaction of a
mortgage. The instruments were subsequently executed in a lawyer's
office and then placed in the donor's safe; Davis was instructed to
deliver them after the donor's death. In holding the gifts ineffectual, the
court stated:
Davis was a bookkeeper of the Malloy Construction Company
and did work for Mr. Malloy, its president; he was subject to
his orders. So far as the record shows there were no special
contract relations between Malloy and Davis or between Davis
and the grantees in so far as the deeds were concerned. 1
Although the result reached is technically correct, the contractual and
business associations depicted by the court reflect the influence of these
incidental aspects of the typical factual pattern. These distracting factors
must be differentiated from a pertinent search for a contract right in the
donee to the object of the "gift."
In Matter of Cardwell,42 the trial court characterized the superintendent of the donor's apartment house as clearly the agent of the
donor. When en route to the hospital, the donor left the subject matter
of the gift with him, along with instructions to pass it on to the donor's
nephew, if the donor failed to return. Although the similarity to the
Grymes case is apparent, the appellate courts only reached a satisfactory
solution by finding that a conversation between the nephew and the
superintendent, which transpired before the donor's death, converted
the superintendent into a double agent (that is, an agent of both the
40. 253 App. Div. 30, 1 N.Y.S.2d 184 (3d Dep't 1937), aff'd, 278 N.Y. 429, 17

N.E.2d 108 (1939).
41. 253 App. Div. at 32, 1 N.Y.S.2d at 186-87.
42. 180 Misc. 854, 43 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Surr. Ct. 1943), rev'd, 268 App Div. 514, 52

N.Y.S.2d 69 (2d Dep't 1944), aff'd mer., 295 N.Y. 916, 68 N.E.2d 29 (1946).
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donor to deliver, and the donee to receive, the gift at the one and the
same time). A dissenting opinion took the position that the gift should
fail and pointed to the inconsistencies involved in the majority's theory:
There is no dispute as to the facts. The deceased gave orders to
Rowenhagen that "If anything happens to me or I should not
come back, I want Bob (the deceased's nephew) to have this
(the envelope containing the bankbook.)" From this instruction
it is clear that the deceased wished his agent to give the bankbook to the donee if the deceased did not come back from the
hospital alive ...
In these circumstances there was no delivery to the donee.
Even if we were to assume that the bankbook had in fact been
accepted by the nephew and then returned to the agent, such
purported delivery would not have been valid because contrary
to the instructions of the deceased to Rowenhagen. He had told
Rowenhagen that the nephew was to have the bankbook only in
case "I should not come back." Though there was ample proof
of an intention to give, such intention was defeated since there
was not, nor could there have been, a delivery during the lifetime
of the deceased. (Cf. Beaver v. Beaver, 117 N.Y. 421, 429.)" 3
Other recent cases have found it necessary to make use of the double
agency construction in order to work out a completion of the initial
agency in the lifetime of the donor."
The fact that the intermediary is often the attorney or employee
of the donor, or socially closer to him, appears to be a misleading or
unreliable yardstick for several reasons. The existence of a contractual
or business relation between the donor and the third party does not carry
with it the corollary that such a relation was involved in the transmittal
of the gift. The fallacy clearly appears in the case of employees and
other business associates who normally have no authority to represent
the donor in or out of the commercial field.45 With respect to the social
43. 268 App. Div. at 515-16, 52 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71.
44. See, e.g., Matter of Wilson, 26 Misc. 2d 839, 206 N.Y.S.2d 323 (Surr. Ct.
1960). Another illustration of the illogical results to which an undue emphasis on
agency can lead is found in Vaccaro v. Prudential Condensed Milk Co., 133 Misc. 556,
232 N.Y. Supp. 299 (City Ct. 1927). There the court concluded that since a housewife
purchased groceries as the "agent" of her husband, she herself could not bring a breach
of warranty action (the case, of course, is not followed).
45. The commentators appear to have been led astray as well. One text contains
the following synopsis of the existing case-law:
Because no transfer of dominion and control takes place thereby, delivery to
the donor's agent or attorney, as distinguished from delivery to an agent or
attorney of the donee, is not truly a delivery, and is therefore insufficient.
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relation, although never expressed, the implication appears to be that the
selection of a member of the donee's family, or a friend of the donee,
would conversely lead to a finding that an agency had been created on
behalf of the donee. Both of these assumptions, however, ignore the fact
that the donor quite naturally would be prone to select someone in his
own circle, if for no other reason than the fact that such a person would
be in the donor's day-to-day company and hence available to act as the
intermediary. Moreover, if the donor were to seek out an individual more
identified with the donee than with himself, he could just as well go to
the donee and forego the convenience an intermediary affords. Again,
the need for secrecy and kindred intangible factors might lead to use of
a confidant, for reasons wholly unrelated to agency or a desire to retain
strings on the property. In a similar vein, the fact that the donor requested
the third party to act should never be determinative of the agency issue,
since from the very nature of the transaction it will invariably be the
The same rule has been applied in the case of delivery to the attorney for the
donor's closely held corporation.
25 N.Y. JuR. Gifts § 23 (1962). A student comment on the Cardwell decision contains
the following passage: "[T]he superintendent and the donor occupy the relationship of
employer-employee impelling the assumption that the superintendent is agent of the
donor." 13 FORDHAm L. Rv. 115 (1944).
This development is somewhat inconsistent with the cases in which an individual
possessing a power of attorney from the donor (relating to the subject matter of the
gift) has been found to be the agent or trustee of the donee. See, e.g., Matter of Mills,
172 App. Div. 530, 158 N.Y. Supp. 1100 (1st Dep't), aff'd mern., 219 N.Y. 642, 114 N.E.
1072 (1916). In Thomas v. Friedman, 194 Misc. 694, 87 N.Y.S.2d 369 (City Ct. 1949),
the court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint grounded on the assertion that the intermediary formerly was engaged as attorney for the donor. Additional evidence was
held to be necessary to establish the attorney's role in the donative transfer. The courts
may be erring due to a belief that an agency designation, once arrived at, exhausts the
available theories. Is it possible that the intermediary was acting for the donor in
transmitting, and for the donee in receiving, the gift? An illustration of multiple views
of a single substantive law designation, depending on the issue raised, is found in
Llewellyn, Across Sales On Horseback, 52 HAsv. L. Rv. 725 (1939).
But if a merchant, as to some wares in transit pursuant to a contract, says
"This carload is mine," the fact-side of the statement says only "This is what
I shipped," and the ownership-side is not only no proper conclusion from that,
but is no proper conclusion for any layman to draw from anything that has
occurred; and it also makes a deal of difference what the issue may be. The
wares may be "seller's" for proper stoppage in transit, and yet be "his buyer's"
for purposes of action for the price, and yet again be "either's," for purposes
of recovering damage suffered in transit-and all on the same facts. Now
when the location of "the property" in the wares thus gets far enough away
from homely fact to need a lawyer to decide about it, but is supposed to be
determined by the intentions of parties who are not lawyers, that is not so good.
And when the lawyers themselves have difficulty in doing the deciding, that is
worse. It bothers predictability, even for lawyers; but it is extremely hard on
parties who desire so to "intend" as to get a really intended result on which they
want to reckon.
Id. at 733. Thus viewed, it may be argued that the approach of double agency, previously discussed, has some merit, at least as a starting point for construction of a new
theory.
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donor who decides to make a gift and to make the request.
The courts' inclination to find an agency on behalf of the donor
seems peculiarly inappropriate in cases where the third party is requested
to transmit an object after the donor's death.4" To hold that the death
terminates the latter's authority to turn over the object to the donee is
to conclude that the donor initially created a completely futile arrangement. Although it may be argued that this reasoning is false in that the
donor may have unwittingly, rather than intentionally, produced the
situation (being unaware of the legal implications of agency), the fact
remains that if no such agency is apparent, there is no justification for
implying it and thereby frustrating the donor's arrangement. If the
agency inquiry were centered on the aspect of retained control, more
satisfactory results would be achieved. Here again, however, it is likely
that the donor, solely intent on making the gift, did not give a thought
to the question whether he reserved the right to retrieve the property
pending its ultimate transfer to the donee. He may have regarded the
third party as an extension of himself, inasmuch as the intermediary
was serving as a means of transmittal "for" the donor in a general sense,
or, to put it another way, was doing the donor a "favor" by so acting.
Nevertheless, it is probable that, at the same time, the donor had no
thought of retaining strings on the property while it was in the hands
of the third person and viewed the gift as an accomplished fact as soon as
the subject matter was handed to the intermediary. It would appear
that these two conflicting inferences, for all practical purposes, cancel one
another out. Hence, a realistic approach to the agency question would
have its inception in two realizations: one, that the determinative factor
is the intention of the donor with respect to the control retained, if any,
and the other, that in all probability the donor never gave the matter a
thought. If the donor manifested an intention one way or the other, this
settles the matter. However, the courts frequently appear to reconstruct
the donor's intention on the strength of off-hand language used by him
in requesting the third party to act. The language employed is likely to
have been a mere chance selection of words to express the general notion
of transmittal of the property to the donee and too slim a reed upon which
46. New York has not taken the position that a gift cannot be delivered to an
attorney or other third party, with enjoyment by the donee postponed until after the
donor's death. In view of this fact, and the Gryines v. HonW decision, several of the recent cases denying recognition to gifts because they were to be delivered after the

donor's death appear to be poorly reasoned. Perhaps the courts are influenced by the
analogy of the executor carrying out the desires of the testator with respect to disposition of his assets after death. A return to the focus of whether the gift was intended
to take effect immediately upon the transfer to the intermediary would produce more

satisfactory results.
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to base agency conclusions. What fine distinctions, for example, can be
supported by the use of "to be delivered" to the donee as opposed to
"this is for the donee"? If, as many have pointed out, it is realized that
the quest for the donor's intention often comes down to an inquiry as to
"what the donor would have thought about the matter, had he thought
about it, although he did not think about it,"4 it would appear that the
courts are forced to conclude that the donor intended that the intermediary
act for the donee, if for no other reason than this would effectuate
his donative intent. Any other imputed intention would not make sense
in view of the donor's expressed desire to make a gift and his tradition
of the property to the third party in aid of that purpose. Again, viewed
from the standpoint of competing desiderata to be achieved by attributing
one intention or the other to the donor where the evidence is silent or
equivocal, the several values fostered by upholding a gift would appear
to favor imputing the intention of making the intermediary the agent
of the donee. The opposite approach would serve no useful purpose, not
even fraud prevention, since there is no intrinsic relationship between
fraud and the agency status of the intermediary."
47. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40 (2d
TARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 30, at 228-29

ed. 1955); 1 WALSH, COMaEN(1947).
48. On occasion the courts have confused the agency issue by referring to it in
cases in which the donor was merely engaged in preliminary preparations to make a
gift. Thus, for example, where a third party is requested to accomplish certain tasks
and to return to the donor with the subject matter of the gift, there is obviously no
intention to make a present gift and the intermediary is in no sense an agent or trustee
for the donee. In the recent case of Matter of Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 176 N.E.2d 395
(1961), the Court of Appeals was presented with such a situation and rested its decision
on the following rationale:
We would say that, where a transfer of a part interest in stock certificates is
concerned, a symbolical delivery would be sufficient for it is the only kind of
delivery that would be practicable under the circumstances where undoubtedly
the donor would want to retain possession of the certificate. Nevertheless,
even this sort of delivery must proceed to a point of no return, and this point
can only be reached when there is a transfer of record on the stock books of
the company. Obviously the donor does not surrender dominion and control of
a part interest until the transfer of record is made because up until that time he
may change his mind and withdraw his directive to the transfer agent. In the
case at bar the transfer of record was not made in decendent's life time and
hence a valid gift inter vivos was not completed as to any interest in the stock
in question, even as to the certificate for 50 shares which the decedent first
indorsed. This indorsement was evidence of her intent but it was not sufficient
to complete a symbolic delivery. The transfer agent was her agent for the
purpose of delivery and subject to her direction until the transfer was completed on the books of the company. She had the power to revoke the agency up
until the time the transfer, or symbolical delivery, was actually made (Vincent
v. Rix, supra, 248 N.Y. at page 83, 161 N.E. at page 427). Her death automatically revoked the agency.
Matter of Szabo, 10 N.Y.2d 94, 98-99, 178 N.E.2d 395, 396-97. The court correctly
ruled the gift to be ineffective, as an examination of the record reveals that no present
gift was intended. The employment of an agency theory, however, has led to unnecessary uncertainty. Under the applicable provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer
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Another aspect of the agency problem seldom discussed is that in
some cases the donor hands the gift to the third party merely because
the donee is absent or unavailable at the time. If this fact provides the
principal or sole motivation for employment of the intermediary, it would
appear that circumstances prevented manual tradition and hence constructive delivery should be authorized. If absence of the res is viewed
as sufficient, the courts should regard absence of the donee in at least
as favorable a light, since the donor, as owner of the property, could have
arranged to have the res available to facilitate delivery, whereas he would
not ordinarily be able to control the movements of the donee so as to
guarantee his presence. Accordingly, the use of the intermediary under
such circumstances is wholly explainable in terms of the absence of the
donee, with the third party standing in the donee's place.49
THE "CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE" TEST

Several states, including New York, have adopted the "clear and
convincing evidence" test, or some variant thereof, as the standard of
proof to be applied where claims are asserted against an estate." According to Professor Wigmore, the utilization of such a burden is
grounded an an attempt to apply the criminal law burden of proof to
civil litigation:
Policy suggests that the latter [criminal] test should be strictly
confined to its original field, and that there ought to be no attempt to employ it in any civil case. Nevertheless, the effort has
been made . . . to introduce it in certain sorts of civil cases

where an analogy seems to obtain [including deceased donor
Act, no transfer on the books of the corporation is necessary in order to effectuate a
gift of shares of stock. See UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER Acr §§ 1, 9; N.Y. PEgs. PROP.
LAW §§ 162, 170. If the language of this opinion is taken literally, a change in existing
law has been brought about. However, it is probable that no such effect was intended
and that transfer on the corporation's books will not be considered essential to an
effectual gift. Again, it is unlikely that the law has been changed concerning a delivery by means of a safe deposit box key or bank book, despite the fact that the donor
could telephone and direct the depositary to refuse to recognize the donee.
49. The cases in which the donor transmits property to a third party, intending
thereby to make a gift to an absent member of the armed forces, demonstrate that the
absence of the donee is often the only reason prompting the use of an intermediary.
Nevertheless, the agency focus has sometimes prevented recognition of such a gift.
See, e.g., Matter of Adams, 58 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Surr. Ct. 1945) (not otherwise reported).
50. Matter of Malysiak, 15 App. Div. 2d 586, 221 N.Y.S.2d 911 (3d Dep't 1961);
Matter of Brown, 130 Misc. 865, 226 N.Y. Supp. 1 (Surr. Ct. 1927), modified, 225 App.
Div. 759, 232 N.Y. Supp. 371 (2d Dep't 1928) ; Matter of Yudis, 11 Misc. 2d 958, 173
N.Y.S.2d 789 (Surr. Ct. 1958).
In Matter of Gordon, 17 App. Div. 2d 165, 232
N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dep't 1962), the court indicated that corroborative testimony,
though not required, would be of great assistance to a donee-plaintiff.
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situations]. ..

"

The courts, however, have steadfastly maintained that the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard applicable in such situations merely requires the donee to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence. 2
The following passage from McKeon v. Van Slyck,"3 is often quoted
in support of that view:
No doubt in determining whether the preponderance exists, the
triers of the facts must not forget that death has sealed the lips
of the alleged promisor. They may reject evidence in such circumstances which might satisfy them if the promisor were
living. They must cast in the balance the evidence offered upon
the one side and the opportunities for disproof upon the other.
They may, therefore, be properly instructed that to make out a
preponderance, the evidence should be clear and convincing.
(Roberge v. Bonner, 185 N.Y. 265). But all these instructions
in last analysis are merely counsels of caution. The responsibility of determining whether the evidence is clear and convincing must ultimately rest upon the jury, subject, of course,
to the power of the court to set aside their verdict. 4
Although the foregoing rationale has been acted upon by the courts and
reiterated, it is doubtful whether it can withstand close scrutiny. Thus,
for example, it might seriously be questioned whether an instruction by a
trial judge who took the quoted language literally and charged the jury
in a negligence or breach of contract action that the plaintiff must
prove his case by clear and convincing evidence (rather than by a preponderance of the evidence) would be upheld on appeal.5" Even if it
51. 9 WiGmom, EVIDEnCe § 2498, at 327 (3d ed. 1940).
52. See cases cited supra note 50.
53. 223 N.Y. 392, 119 N.E. 851 (1918).

54. Id. at 397-98, 119 N.E. at 853.
55. Query whether such a charge in an inter vivos gift case, where the alleged
donor is alive at the time of the trial, would constitute reversible error?
The English courts have experienced difficulty in this area. The following theory
was advanced by Denning, LJ., in Bater v. Bater, [1951] P. 35 (C.A.):
[In civil cases, the case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but
there are degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends upon the subject matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will
naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require when asking if negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a
degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of criminal
nature; but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate

with the occasion.
Id. at 37. For related Commonwealth decisions, see Dixon, The Standard of Proof Required, 10 AusTL. CONVEYANCER & SoLIcTORas J. 33 (1957).
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were possible to equate these two burdens in theory, it is doubtful
whether they may be equated in practice. The average juror could reasonably conclude that a "clear" case and a "convincing" case calls for more
by way of proof than a slight edge over one's opponent. One might justifiably interpret the judge's directions as calling for a degree of persuasion
somewhere between a preponderance and proof beyond all reasonable
doubt. A juror confused by such a charge, or one calling for the concurrent application of the preponderance and the clear and convincing
formulas, may well resolve the conflict by requiring proof which produces moral certitude.
In cases tried without a jury, the same difficulties arise. An indication that the law-trained individual will also encounter obstacles in attempting to apply the standard may be found in the reformation cases
from the same jurisdiction, wherein the test is said to be that:
[B] efore reformation can be granted the plaintiff "must establish his right to such relief by clear, positive and convincing
evidence. Reformation may not be granted upon a probability
nor even upon a mere preponderance of evidence but only on a
certainty of error." . . ."
The commentators on the law of evidence have also expressed concern
over the confusion generated by this elusive standard.5" Their attempts
to give it meaning have invariably centered around the degree of persuasion which must be produced in the trier of the facts, a state of
certitude located somewhere between that required by the civil and
criminal law norms. 58
56. Ross v. Food Specialties, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 336, 341, 160 N.E.2d 618, 620 (1959).
See Nash v. Kornbloom, 12 N.Y.2d 42, 186 N.E.2d 551 (1962); Broido v. Busick, 33
Misc. 2d 804, 221 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1961).

57. See, e.g., McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 320 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLE7\S OF
EVIDENCE 23 (1954) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2498 (3d ed. 1940) ; McBaine, Burde); of
Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242 (1944).
58. It has been persuasively suggested that [the various forms of stating the
clear and convincing evidence burden] . . . could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded
that the truth of the contention is "highly probable."
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 320, at 679 (1954).
See also RICHIADsoN, EVIDENCE § 97 (8th
ed. 1955); FISCH, NEw YORK EVIDENCE § 1094 (1959). In MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS
OF EVIDENCE (1954), the following synthesis is advanced:
It will be noted that [the clear and convincing evidence] . . . instruction emphasizes the means of persuasion rather than the requisite mental condition of
the trier. It is believed, however, that the courts intend to require a greater
degree of conviction by the trier, and that the proposition could be better phrased
as requiring the trier to find the existence of the fact to be highly probable or
much more probable than not.
Id. at 23.
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The object of employing the "dear and convincing evidence" formula
appears to be fraud prevention, specifically, to compensate for the fact
that the alleged donor is not available to testify concerning the transaction." Nevertheless, it would appear that this consideration or caveat
could be embodied in the judge's charge, without the addition of the clear
and convincing test. The judge sitting with or without a jury may
consciously or unconsciously view the requirement of clear and convincing
proof as a factor to be considered in addition to the fraud possibility,
rather than as another way of stating the latter."0 Another troublesome
feature of the standard is that it may frequently affect the court's thinking
on the substantive law and prevent the employment of a broad approach
to the technical requirements."' Literal compliance with existing substantive law formulas may be exacted in addition to, or in lieu of, clear
proof that the transaction actually occurred. The position of the doneeplaintiff whose case will be processed under such a rubric can readily be
appreciated. Nor is there a real possibility of achieving a reversal on
appeal in a case wherein a preponderance has been established but not
a wholly clear case for relief. The appellate courts are quite reluctant
to reverse a trial court's finding for the reasons normally applicable to
any appeal from a factual determination, in addition to the fraud
possibilities and the clear and convincing requirement. In net effect, this
burden of proof operates in the same fashion as the substantial evidence
rule in appeals from the factual determination of an administrative
agency; the case is won or lost in the trial stage.
CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY, AGENCY AND PROOF IN RETROSPECT

The outline of the actual operation of the constructive delivery
doctrine in a single state points up the fact that neither the delivery nor
constructive delivery concept enables one to synthesize the cases or to
formulate a completely logical and symmetrical set of principles. The
59. "Because many gifts are sought to be shown by oral evidence after the donor's
death, it is necessary for the public good to require clear and satisfactory evidence of
the fact to prevent fraud and perjury." Matter of Van Alstyne, 207 N.Y. 298, 308, 100
N.E. 802, 805 (1913). It is suggested that this test, when taken in conjunction with the
restrictions imposed on the donee by the "dead man's statute," overly compensate for the
fact that the alleged donor is deceased.
60. Thus, for example, the judge must typically formulate, and the jury apply, a
charge or instruction which indicates that (1) the clear and convincing evidence test
must govern, and (2) that the death of the donor (and hence the possibility of fraud)
may be properly considered in coming to a conclusion.
61. The gift cases may represent the reverse of the Workmen's Compensation
problem; in the latter area some fear that the principle of liberal interpretation of
social legislation may result in an overly-generous view of the facts, whereas in the
former, the fear is that a distrust of the facts or evidence will lead to a rigid interpretation of the substantive law requirement.
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inconsistencies are attributable to many factors-the large number of
cases in which no appeal was taken, an uneven application of the delivery
and constructive delivery formulas, and the innumerable situations in
which, and methods by which, a donation is attempted, are a few of the
obvious causes. A continuing source of difficulty is found in the fact
that the gift cases align some of the law's most revered ideals on opposite
sides of the litigation. Thus, for example, in the case where an alleged
gift was made to a child by an ailing parent, the donee can rely upon
enforcement of intention, the naturalness of the gift, the constructive
delivery exception and kindred factors. The estate can cite to the possibility of fraud, the confidential relationship existing and the sealing of
the donor's lips by death. As a consequence, the solution reached in any
given case can be made to appear as the only correct one possible. The
existence of myriad, irreconcilable precedents also enables one to find
"authority" for almost any viewpoint. Of course, a correct factual
determination at the trial level is not vitiated by an illogical opinion.
However, such an opinion does serve to confuse the issue in succeeding
cases.
The constructive delivery cases typically center around factual patterns in which fraud is not in issue and some act of partial fulfillment
has occurred, that is, the donor has moved beyond the stage of mere verbal
expression of donative intent. It is submitted that the same motivating
force which prompts the courts to utilize the doctrine of part performance
to override the statute of frauds-the desire to achieve a just and sensible
result-should lead the courts to a similar approach in this area with
respect to the delivery requirement. 2 The chose in action cases supply
an apt illustration of the satisfactory results which may be accomplished
by employment of such a theory. Thus, for example, it has been held that
transfer of a bank book, accompanied by the necessary donative intent,
will suffice to consumate a gift of the account. 3 In so holding, the courts
have dismissed arguments based on by-laws of the bank which stipulate
that written notice must be given, or other formal requirements satisfied,
before recognition will be accorded a change in ownership. The courts,
moreover, have upheld such gifts despite the fact that the bank's requirements were consented to in advance, appear on the bank book itself, and
62. The role played by the desideratum of enforcing a contractual arrangement supported by consideration would be supplanted in the gift cases by the several considerations outlined in the first installment of this paper.
A more novel theory of gifts, based on intention alone, was proposed as early as
1651. See HOmEs, LEViATHON 88 (Oakeshott ed. 1946). See also Roberts, The Necessity of Delivery in Making Gifts, 32 W. VA. L. R~v. 313 (1926).
63. See, e.g., Ridden v. Thrall, 125 N.Y. 572, 26 N.E. 627 (1891); Shumsky v.
Dime Say. Bank, 22 Misc. 2d 20, 190 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1959).

PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY
were issued pursuant to statutory authority.64 The accepted theory is
that the prerequisites are established for the protection of the bank and
are not meant to be principles governing creation of rights in and to the
account. Issuance of a court order authorizing the donee to receive the
funds is viewed as neutralizing these conditions and as affording the
depositary all the protection necessary. (Similar rulings have been made
in cases where regulations pertaining to endorsement of securities, transfer of stock on the books of a corporation, or access to a safe deposit box,
were not complied with.") Although the concept of "equitable title" in
the donee is frequently relied upon to support the decisions reached, the
cases under discussion are, of course, sanctioning a delivery which gives
the donee neither possession nor control- in many instances, and to that
extent assume a completed gift before the court renders its assistance to
the "equitable" owner.6 A technical insistence upon complete transfer of
dominion and control would require complete conformity with such bylaws and regulations and might necessitate a finding that the donor could
more easily obtain access to the savings account without the bank book
than the donee could with it. Again, a more perfect transfer would be
possible through withdrawal of the funds, followed by their manual
transfer to the donee. The fact that the highest or most perfect form of
transfer was not employed, however, should seldom be controlling where
a substantial overt act is shown which suggests itself as being a natural
method of transfer, while signifying the donor's intention to make an
immediate gift.
Perspective will be returned to the agency cases if it is realized that:
Too much nicety may be exercised in determining whom the
third man exactly represents. If it is possible to do so, the law
ought to be construed not too logically, but to meet the common
transactions of our people ..
."
64. E.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 238, 317. See note 63 supra.
65. See, e.g., Miller v. Silverman, 247 N.Y. 447, 160 N.E. 910 (1928) ; Carples v.
Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 240 N.Y. 187, 148 N.E. 185 (1925); Grymes v. Hone, 49
N.Y. 17, 10 Am. Rep. 313 (1872) ; Matter of Mills, 172 App. Div. 530, 158 N.Y. Supp.
1100 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 219 N.Y. 642, 114 N.E. 1072 (1916). Similarly, a constructive delivery by way of tradition of automobile keys has been sustained, without a
change of the registration being required. See, e.g., Matter of Lines, 21 Misc. 2d 699,
201 N.Y.S.2d 290 (Surr. Ct. 1959).
66. The difficult position of the depositary, which cannot rely solely upon a

claimant's possession of the bank book or key, may be gleaned from a reading of Myers
v. Albany Say. Bank, 270 App. Div. 466, 60 N.Y.S.2d 477 (3d Dep't), aff'd men., 296
N.Y. 562, 68 N.E.2d 866 (1946) ; Noah v. Bowery Say. Bank, 225 N.Y. 284, 122 N.E.
235 (1919); Laurent v. Williamsburgh Say. Bank, 137 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(not otherwise reported).
67. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 105 S.C. 459, 466, 90 S.E. 34, 36 (1916). Perhaps the best
statement of the need to strike a balance between conceptualism and the practices of the
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In addition, a tacit assumption or inference that the intermediary is the
agent of the donor should not be indulged in, solely on the strength of a
business or social relationship previously established between these parties.
Nor should such an assumption be grounded on the fact that the donor
requested the intermediary to act. The agency consideration is a deceptive one, akin to the delivery doctrine itself, in that it gives the appearance of a coldly logical rationale and an inescapable conclusion. However,
the foregoing discussion demonstrates that a court's decision as to whether
to go into the agency issue in ambiguous cases itself represents a value
judgment. Perhaps the courts are reluctant to view the third party as the
donee's agent in view of the donee's ignorance of the intermediary's
existence or mission and the consensual nature of agency. This problem
may be avoided, however, by viewing the intermediary as a stakeholder or
escrowee, in situations wherein it does not appear that the donor intendea
to retain control over the property.
The "ciear and convincing evidence" standard may be regarded as
psychologically unsound and confusing. Nevertheless, it is too well
established to be easily or soon dislodged. Some measure of improvement,
however, is possible, if the operation of this burden of proof is explained
in terms of the degree of conviction to be brought about in the trier of the
facts, and not, as in current practice, in terms of the quality of the evidence
introduced. In sum, the subject of the law of gifts is a quaint one-full
of interesting theoretical problems for lawyers and judges to ponder.
Yet the bonds of conceptualism must be broken if a truly satisfactory
legal position is to be evolved to cover this simplest of human endeavors.
society which legal concepts serve is contained in the following passage from Levi, The
Natural Law, Precedent, And Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L. REv. 587 (1938) :
The real naivete would be to assume that we could do without concepts and
therefore write only on practical situations, ignoring the standard concepts.
But throughout the law, practical solutions have been impeded by mystical discussions. These mystical discussions again have their place insofar as they

keep the law from getting ahead of the common notions of the community.
But there is such a thing as getting behind the common notions of the community. Thus the courts of this country have floundered for at least a quarter
of a century in an endeavor to discover whether a joint deposit in a bank with
an intended right of survivorship, called a poor man's will, is a trust, a contract, a contract creating a joint tenancy, a joint tenancy, a gift, a third party
beneficiary contract, an agency, or a testamentary disposition.

The problem

apparently has not been whether according to our notions it is a good thing to
allow a poor man's will in this fashion. It has only been whether the joint
deposit will be laid on the altar of one idol or another. And the inability of
the courts to realize that the public around them sees a new concept, the concept of joint deposit, which can be molded to do what is thought to be justice
is somewhat shocking.
Id. at 609-10. See Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L. J.1, 39 (1941).
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